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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF TOMPKINS, 
-and-
Respondent, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
TOMPKINS COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party. 
#2A-8/10/77 
CASE NO. U-23 72 
DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of Tompkins County 
from a hearing officer's decision finding a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law— in that it adopted a resolution 
providing for reimbursement of "moving expense" costs for certain 
2/ 
new employees within the CSEA negotiating unit.—' 
In an opinion issued on May 8, 1967, which was before the 
Taylor Law took effect, the state comptroller determined that a 
county may, pursuant to an appropriate local law, reimburse an 
officer or employee for his expenses in moving into that county 
in order to accept the office or employment (23 Op. St. Compt. #2S 
3/ Two years later Tompkins County enacted such a local law.— It 
established a moving expense policy. That policy required a 
resolution of the County Board of Supervisors for it to have any 
4/ impact. Such a resolution was adopted afterwards.— \ It is 
applicable to candidates for specified positions within the 
negotiating unit represented by CSEA who are residing outside 
Tompkins County and would be relocating to a residence within the 
county should they accept an offer of employment. As an inducement 
'8 
3). 
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to come to Tompkins County to work, such person would be reimbursed 
for the relocation expenses. The critical provision of the County 
resolution is 
"Ifj for any reason, the individual's employment with the 
County is terminated within one year from the date that 
individual reports for work, the individual shall be 
responsible for repayment to the County for the full 
payment amount." 
A state law authorizes reimbursement for moving expenses upon 
initial appointment to State service (St.Finance Law §6-d) which 
has one significant difference. It provides that the employee 
must refund the money paid to him for his moving expense;"...in 
the event that he resigns or voluntarily separates from the position 
to which he was initially appointed within one year of the effec-
tive date of such appointment." The difference is that the County 
resolution requires a refund regardless of the reason for the job 
applicant's termination. It would be due even if the employee is 
discharged or laid off. 
The charge herein was filed three weeks after the adoption of 
the resolution by the Tompkins County Board of Supervisors. 
In its exceptions, Tompkins County argues, first, that CSEA 
waived its right to negotiate over the details of a moving expense* 
policy. The basis for this proposition is that the moving expense 
policy was first adopted in 1969 and CSEA/n^er sought negotiations 
on this subject since then. We reject this argument. "The waiver 
by an employee organization of its statutorily protected right to 
negotiate an agreement must be an explicit one.", Matter of City oi 
Mount Vernon, 5 PERB H3057 at p. 3101 (1972). The failure of an 
employee organization to make a demand relating to a term and 
condition of employment at one point In time does not constitute 
a w a i v e r of Its r&ght to negotiate over that subject in £|^jf||ture 
Neither does it constitute a waiver of its right to object to 
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unilateral action by the public employer regarding such term and 
condition' of" employment. 
The second basis for Tompkins County's exceptions is that 
reimbursement of moving expenses of a successful candidate for 
employment is not a term and condition of employment of employees 
within the negotiating unit; therefore, Tompkins County did not 
violate its duty to negotiate in good faith when it adopted such 
a practice unilaterally. This proposition does not justify the 
county's conduct, which went beyond the reimbursement of moving 
expenses to successful candidates for employment. The resolution 
of the Board of Supervisors conditions the right of the successful 
job applicant to reimbursement for moving expenses upon his con-
tinuing in the employment•of Tompkins County for one year; thus, 
it is compensation not only for taking the job, but also for per-
forming satisfactorily in it for one year. 
Compensation for satisfactory performance in a job is a 
term and condition of employment. It makes no difference that 
such compensation was agreed upon before the successful job 
applicant was hired or that it was reimbursement for expenses 
incurred in the taking of the job. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
(5th Circuit) dealt with a similar question in NLRB v. Laney and 
Duke Co., 369 F2d 859 (1966), 63 LRRM 2552. That case dealt with 
an employment application form that required extensive personal 
data about the job applicant and required the applicant to consent 
to polygraph tests at the company's request or to resign upon his 
refusal to do so. The Court found that the request for the per-
sonal information was appropriate, but that the consent to taking 
a polygraph test was not. It said that an employer could not "by 
unilateral action" require a job applicant to answer questions 
that could affect conditions of employment and (at pp 2555-6) 
4811 
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"Since the application forms affected conditions 
of employment they were a legitimate subject of 
collective bargaining. The unilateral action of 
the company relating thereto constituted a refusal 
to bargain....The duty to bargain is a continuing 
onej and a union may legitimately bargain over wages 
and conditions of employment which will affect 
employees who are to be hired in the future." 
Such is the case here, where the employer did provide a benefit 
iro~~sTTcc~e~ssTu~r~^  
ment with the county is [not] terminated within one year from the 
date that individual reports for work...." In part, reimbursement 
for moving expenses as specified in the resolution of the Tompkins 
County Board of Supervisors is compensation for successful comple-
tion of one year's work on behalf of the County. Such compensation 
is a term and condition of employment and a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. A provision, such as that applicable to State 
employees, which would require a refund in the event that the 
employee resigned or voluntarily separated from his position 
within one year would be in the nature of a pre-hire inducement to 
the applicant to take a position with the County and re-
main with it for one year. The added requirement here, however, 
that the employee be required to make reimbursement even upon 
involuntary separation from service within one year makes the. 
payment of money for moving expenses a term and condition of that 
first year of his employment. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE AFFIRM the determination of the hearing 
officer that Tompkins County violated its duty to negotiate in 
good faith by unilaterally altering terms and conditions of 
39^-0 
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employment in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law, and 
WE ORDER it to negotiate in good faith. 
DATED: New5 Tor to. New York 
August 10, 1977 
Joseph R. "Crowley 
Ida Klaus 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ Section 2 09-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law declares it to be an 
improper employer practice "...to refuse to negotiate in good 
faith with the duly recognized or certified representative 
of its public employees." 
2/ The charge had been brought by the Tompkins County unit of 
the Civil Service Employees Organization (CSEA). A second 
specification of the charge was dismissed by theshearing 
officer. It alleged that Tompkins County had violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith in that it had not made a 
timely wage offer during negotiations. There were no 
exceptions to the dismissal of this specification of the 
charger 
3/ Tompkins County, Local Law #4, 19 69 states: 
"To authorize reimbursement of moving expenses to 
employees assuming positions in the County of Tompkins, 
be it enacted by the Board of Supervisors of Tompkins 
County, New York as follows: 
Section 1. 
Payment or reimbursement to officers or employees of 
• their expenses of moving into the County of Tompkins so 
that they may assume positions of employment are hereby 
authorized in accordance with said local law. 
Section 2. 
Said reimbursement or payment of said moving expenses 
shall be authorized only when approved by the Board of 
Supervisors of the County of Tompkins by resolution duly 
adopted by the Board. 
Section 3. 
This law shall be effective immediately." 
4/ The complete Resolution #229 of October 11, 1976, states: 
Adoption of Moving Expense Policy 
RESOLVED, on recommendation of the Budget and 
Administration Committee and a majority of the Personnel 
Committee that the following policy be adopted in conjunction 
with Local Law #4 - 1969 and Resolution #215 adopted November 
13, 1969 to provide for reimbursement of moving expenses to 
new county employees. 
1. Moving expense reimbursement will be applicable to only 
those instances where the individual resides outside 
Tompkins County and will be relocating to a residence 
within the County. 
481-
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Moving expenses reimbursed will be limited to actual 
cost but not to exceed. fifteen hundred dollars. 
Moving expense reimbursement paid in accordance with 
this policy will be reduced by reimbursement from 
another source. Should full payment have already been 
made under this policy when an alternate source of 
reimbursement becomes available, the employee shall be 
responsible for repayment to the County for like amount, 
not to exceed the full payment made by the County. 
If, for any reason, the individual's employment with the 
~C~ouni;y™i:s~texm±n~ate~^^ 
individual reports for work, the individual shall be 
responsible for repayment to the County for the full 
payment amount. 
By policy, the following classifications will be eligible 
for moving expense reimbursement: all classifications 
Grade 18 and above and Library Director, Director of 
Nursing, Director of Rehabilitation Center (Meadow House), 
Director of Public Health Nursing, Hospital Plant 
Supervisor, Probation Director, Supervising Pharmacist, 
Airport Manager and County Home Superintendent. 
The County will not ordinarily consider exceptions to the 
moving expense reimbursement policy above. Should highly 
unusual circumstances indicate that such a consideration 
should be examined, such request shall be presented in 
writing to the Personnel Committee and if approved will 
require approval of the Board of Representatives prior 
to any job offcer to the applicant. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
„CXTY-,S.CEQOL^ DISJRLCT_OJ,-THF^ CITY_OJL 
BINGHAMTON, N . Y . , 
Petitioner-Employer, 
-and-
BINGHAMTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIVE-
SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 23 SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPERVISORS ORGANIZING 
COMMITTEE, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor, 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
N.Y., 
Petitioner-Employer, 
-and-
BINGHAMTON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
#2B-8/10/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1425 
CASE NO. C-1426 
On November 10, 1976, the City School District of the City of 
Binghamton, N.Y. (employer) filed a petition to remove department chairpersons 
and teacher consultants from a teachers' unit represented by the Binghamton 
Teachers Association (BTA). It also filed a second petition that day to 
include the department chairpersons and teadher, consultants in the adminis-
trators' unit represented by the Binghamton City School District Administrators 
and Supervisors Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO (BASA). 5 Oli f* 
\ 
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A consolidated hearing was held on both petitions, during the 
course of which an agreement on the disposition of teacher consultants was 
reached. The remaining issue was the unit placement of the department chair-
persons. The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
issued a determination on June 1, 1977 that department heads are supervisors. 
"Accordingly, he ordered their removal from the teachers unit and their inclusion 
in the administrators unit. BTA has filed exceptions to this determination. 
The employer and BASA have filed briefs in support of the determination. 
The teachers unit was established in 1968. The department chair-
persons were included in the unit at that time, pursuant to a stipulation 
between the employer and BTA. In many respects the terms and conditions of 
department heads are similar to those of the teachers and the department heads 
have indicated a preference for remaining in the teachers unit. On the other 
hand, the Director concluded that the supervisory responsibilities of the 
department heads compels the granting of the petition that they be separated 
from the teachers. Among the circumstances that persuaded the Director are 
that department heads 
"have effective input concerning the employer's decision 
to hire, to continue employment of probationary teachers 
and to grant tenure. They too make teaching assignments, 
coordinate the work of their department, are responsible 
for the pedagogical training of their staff, participate 
in the budgeting process, review curriculum and materials, 
and usually are the first step of the grievance procedure." 
Having reviewed the record, we confirm these findings of fact 
of the Director. We also affirm his conclusion that these facts establish the 
supervisory nature of the job of the department chairperson and require that the 
employer's petitions be^ granted. Discussion of a few of the factors on which 
the conclusion is based sufficiently demonstrates the validity of this conclusiop 
BTA's response to the finding that department heads have an effective role in 
the hiring of new teachers is that this is not'adiaraet.erisfcicv of ? supervision. Its 
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reasoning is that no employment relationship exists until after a candidate is 
hired; therefore, the act of hiring a candidate occurs prior to the time when 
a supervisor-subordinate relationship could be deemed to exist. This is a novel 
and unusual argument, but it is not persuasive. The power to hire, and hence 
to determine the basic establishment of the employment relationship3 has long 
been recognized as one of the essential indicia of supervision. We accept the 
~vaiid±ty^of~that~view; '-
BTA responds to the finding that department chairpersons evaluate 
teachers by saying that the evaluation of tenured teachers is pro forma and, 
therefore, of no significance. The responsibility of department heads to 
evaluate probationary teachers is dismissed as being de_ minimis because the 
percentage of probationary teachers on the faculty of the employer is small. It 
also complains that some of the responsibilities of the chairpersons to 
evaluate teachers were added by the respondent in 1970 and others in 1975. 
According to BTA, these added duties have been created by the employer and 
they do not justify relieving the employer of any management problems created 
by its own conduct. In the absence of a showing here that the added duties 
were a fiction and imposed solely for the purposes of defeating the policies 
of the Act, this argument, too, fails to persuade us that the existing unit 
should be retained intact. Evaluation of subordinate employees, even if 
resulting only infrequently in adverse action against them,is nevertheless an 
important factor in guiding teachers to enhance the quality of their 
instruction. Their role in evaluating probationary teachers, as the record 
shows, is particularly effective in the granting or withholding of tenure and 
thus in the determination of the continued employment status of the 
probationers. 
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In view of these circumstances, it is unnecessary for us to discuss 
the implications of the other findings of fact of the Director. We affirm his 
determination that department chairpersons be removed from the teachers' unit 
and included in a unit with other supervisors as follows: 
Included: Department heads, teacher consultants, 
Mminlstrative^assrstantrs-senror^hxgk, 
assistant principals-junior high, 
assistant principals-senior high, head 
nurse teacher, elementary principal, 
junior high principals, senior high 
principals, director of attendance. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot should be 
held under the Director's supervision among the employees in the unit determined 
above to be appropriate and who were employed by the employer on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the employer shall submit to the Director, 
BTA and BASA within seven days from the date of receipt of this decision, an 
alphabetized list of all employees within the unit determined above to be 
appropriate who were employed by the employer on the payroll date immediately 
preceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: . New York, New York 
August 10, 1977 
ROBERT D. HELSBY,/Chairman 
>#t 
JOSEPH/. CROWLEY / 
IDA KLAUS 
IP"? Q 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
EAST RAMAPO TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
Charging Party. 
#2C-8/10/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2124 
The charge herein was filed by the East Ramapo Teachers Association 
(teachers association) on May 20, 1976. It alleges that the East Ramapo Central 
School District (school district) violated §209-a.l(d) by refusing to negotiate 
in good faith in that it unilaterally 
1. eliminated the positions of 13 library media specialists from 
the negotiating unit and transferred their duties to non-unit 
personnel, i. e., "librarian II", a newly created civil service 
position; 
2. eliminated the positions of 37 department chairmen (in departments 
with less than ten teachers) and transferred all or part of 
their duties to other teachers or administrative personnel; 
3. eliminated 3.9 junior high school language teachers and increased 
the workload of the remaining foreign language teachers; and 
4. refused, upon demand, to negotiate the impact of these reductions 
in staff. 
After a hearing which lasted seven days, the hearing officer determined 
that the first specification of the charge had been substantiated by the 
evidence, but that the remaining three had not. 
The First Specification of the Charge 
With respect to this specification, he found that, :as. charged, the school 
district eliminated the position of library media specialist and dE-pa^sf erred 
I 
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the duties of that position to a newly created, non-unit position of librarian 
II. He determined' that the position of librarian II carried a lower salary than 
did the position of library media specialist and that the school district made 
the change in order to avoid its obligation under the existing agreement regardiig 
the salaries of the library media specialists. The school district had defended 
its conduct by alleging that the job of library media specialist was signifi-
cantly different from that of the position of librarian. As stated in the schooL 
district's brief, "The major and critical difference is that the library media 
specialist is a 'teacher-librarian', while the librarian II is essentially a 
'librarian'". The hearing officer rejected this allegation and concluded that 
"the prior functions, duties and responsibilities [of the library media 
specialists] were all to be continued essentially unchanged." He concluded 
that the school district's "unilateral action of transferring the functions 
formerly performed by library media specialists to non-unit employees without 
agreement of the charging party constitutes a violation of §209-2.1(d) of the 
Act." 
A second defense to this specification of the charge was that the school 
district had not refused to negotiate with the teachers association about its 
decision to eliminate the position of library media specialist and to substitute 
for it the position of librarian II. In support of this proposition, it argued 
that there had in fact been negotiations and that it was the teachers 
association which broke them off. The hearing officer, however, determined 
that during the negotiations the school district had been unwilling to even 
consider any proposal that might involve the reinstatement of the position of 
library media specialist and had approached negotiations without any 
willingness to reach any agreement. Moreover, he noted that the school 
district acted unilaterally without first exhausting the conciliation 
procedures provided by §209 of the Taylor Law. '"^ OiSiJL 
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The school district has filed exception to that part of the hearing 
officer's decision which finds it in violation of the first specification of 
the charge. Having reviewed the record and heard the parties' arguments, we 
confirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law on this 
point. Although there is a claim in the record that the duties of the two 
positions were not intended to be identical, the evidence establishes that 
no significant differences between the two positions were ever contemplated 
by the school district. For example, the school district's director of 
personnel testified, among other things, that there had never been any determina 
tion or direction to reduce the library services available to the students of 
the schools. Moreover, inasmuch as a resolution of this factual issue involves 
an evaluation of testimony, we rely heavily upon the judgment of the hearing 
officer, who had an opportunity to observe the witnesses in making that 
evaluation. 
The record thus supports the conclusion of the hearing officer that the 
school district never negotiated in good faith about its decision to transfer 
the job responsibilities of the library media specialists to the librarians. 
The Remaining Three Specifications of the Charge 
The teachers association filed exceptions to so much of the hearing officer 
decision as dismissed the remaining three specifications of the charge. In 
support of the second specification of its charge, the teachers association 
argues that the primary functions of the department chairmen had been transferred 
to non-unit staff and that the hearing officer's finding concerning the first 
specification should also have been made as to the second. However, the hearing 
officer found that much of the work that had been assigned to the department 
chairmen was eliminated along with their jobs, and that while some of the 
*to&& 
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functions of the department chairmen were retained, these were not sufficient 
to bring the facts within the frame of reference of the first specification of 
the charge especially since the retained functions were merely incidental to 
the primary, but eliminated, work of the department chairmen in the areas of 
supervision, administration, and development and implementation of curricula. 
In support of the third specification of the charge, the teachers association 
argues that there was no essential change in the foreign language curriculum 
or-program ""of "the school: aisTzrict- a ^ 
school language teachers was, therefore, a unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment of the language teachers. The hearing officer rejected 
this proposition because the evidence indicated that the junior high school 
foreign-language program was substantially reduced in that certain seventh 
grade foreign language classes were eliminated. 
The hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law on these two 
specifications are affirmed. Moreover, unlike the circumstances of the first 
specification, the duties of foreign language teachers were not transferred to 
non-unit employees. Here there was no duty to negotiate over the elimination of 
the foreign language teachers' positions but only as to the impact of that 
action. (Matter of City School District of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 
113704). 
The hearing officer rejected the fourth specification of the charge, to wit, 
that the school district refused to negotiate the impact of its unilateral 
decision to reduce staff. In its exception, the teachers association interprets 
the hearing officer's adverse decision as being premised upon a finding of a 
waiver of its right to negotiate the impact of the unilateral changes and it 
argues that there is no record evidence of any explicit waiver on its part. 
This is a misinterpretation of the hearing officer's decision. Instead, he 
did not reach the question of waiver, a subject that might have implications for 
the future obligations of the parties; rather he merely determined that the 
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school district had never refused to negotiate concerning the impact of 
its unilateral decisions because the record did not establish that the 
teachers association, which had a fixed negotiating strategy of attempting 
to prevent any change whatsoever, ever followed up its written demand in 
May for such negotiations. 
Having confirmed the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on all essential matters, we determine that the school district violated 
its duty to negotiate in good faith by its unilateral action of transferring 
the functions formerly performed by library media specialists to non-unit 
employees without having first been willing to negotiate about its decision to 
do so, and 
WE ORDER the school district to negotiate in good faith with respect to 
this matter. 
In all other respects, the charge herein is dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1977 
£zt*u&u* 
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
LYNBROOK POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, : ' > 
Respondent, BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
- and -
CASE No. U-2635 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LYNBROOK, : 
Charging Party. 
The charge herein was filed by the Village of Lynbrobk (Village) on 
April 6, 1977. It alleges that the Lynbrook Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA) violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by insisting upon five 
demands that are not mandatory subjects of negotiation and by being unwilling 
to accommodate to the idea of any compromise. At the request of the parties, 
we are processing this case under §204.4 of our Rules. This procedure, 
which leads to an expedited determination, dispenses with the intermediate 
decision of a hearing officer. 
The parties entered into negotiations for an agreement to succeed one that 
expired on May 31, 1975. Eventually an impasse was declared and the dispute 
was submitted to a factfinder on November 5, 1976. PBA's demands remained 
unchanged from the time of their initial presentation except that it raised 
its wage demand from eight and one-half to nine and one-half percent following 
an arbitrator's award to the Nassau County PBA of a nine and one-half percent 
wage increase for that County's 1975 contract. The factfinder's report in 
the instant dispute was issued on March 12, 1977. It was rejected by the PBA, 
which continued to adhere to its original demands as revised by the increased 
wage rate proposal. On March 18, 1977, PBA filed a petition under §209.4 of the 
OaQaJ 
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Taylor Law for interest arbitration and the Village responded by filing this 
charge. 
DISCUSSION 
GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS 
We first considered the nature of the duty to negotiate in good faith in 
Matter of Southampton PBA, 2 PERB 113011 (1969), in which we said (at p. 3274): 
"The duty to negotiate in good faith means that both parties 
approach--the negotiating table-with a-sincere desire—to reach 
an agreement. Thus, good faith is a matter of intention." 
This analysis is similar to the one applicable under the National Labor 
Relations Act. For example, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 
(1960), the U. S. Supreme Court said (at p. 485): 
"Collective bargaining then, is not simply an occasion for purely 
formal meetings between management and labor, while each maintains 
an attitude of 'take it or leave it'; it presupposes a desire to 
reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bargaining 
contract." 
In NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131 (1953), the First Circuit said 
(at p. 135): 
"...While the Board cannot force an employer to make a concession on 
any specific issue or to adopt any particular position, the employer 
is obligated to make some reasonable effort in some direction, to com-
pose his differences with the union if §8(a)5 [the obligation to 
bargain in good faith] is to be read as imposing any substantial 
obligation at all." 
The availability of compulsory interest arbitration under §209.4 of the 
Taylor Law provides a last resort for resolution of a dispute after the parties 
themselves have been unable to reach agreement through good-faith bargaining. 
It is not to be used to preclude genuine bargaining by a fixed take-it-or-
leave-it attitude, which freezes the issues from the outset and seeks to 
force the other side to yield to the demands as presented or have them 
I! 
turned over for resolution to an arbitrator. This is plainly what PBA did in 
1/ Such a take-it-or-leave-it approach to negotiations is wrong. (See NLRB v. 
General Electric Co., 418 F. 2d 736 [2nd Cir., 1969]). A f t 2 6 
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the instant case; and in doing so it violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith. In Matter of Town of Haverstraw, 9 PERB <j[3063 (1976) we said 
(at p. 3109): 
"Interest arbitration is not, and was not, intended as an alterna-
tive to, or substitute for, good faith negotiations. Rather, it is 
a procedure of last resort in police and fire department impasse 
situations when efforts of the parties themselves to reach agreement 
through true negotiations and conciliation procedures have actually 
been^exhaustefdT" — 
DEMANDS ALLEGED TO BE NONMANDATORY 
1. "All employees shall receive an increase in their base salaries, 
exclusive of longevity or other entitlements, of nine and one-
half (9 1/2%) percent." 
The Village argues that this is in fact a demand for "parity" with the 
Nassau County police and, as such, not within the scope of mandatory bargaining. 
In support of this proposition, it points out that the demand was 
increased from eight and one-half to nine and one-half percent when the Nassau 
County police received a raise. It also notes that many of the other substantivja 
demands of PBA are identical with the terms and conditions of the Nassau 
County police. The theory of its charge, as stated in the record, is "...the 
thrust of our entire case is here, identity and parity, with whatever happens to 
Nassau County PBA happens to the Lynbrook PBA." We do not agree with the 
characterization of the Village. In Matter of City of Albany, 7 PERB 113079, 
the majority of this Board observed (at p. 3146): 
"...•There is a relationship between the settlement of a public 
employer with an employee organization representing some of its 
employees and the settlement of another employee organization re-
presenting other employees. Settlements often follow established 
patterns...This is not inappropriate." 
In that case, the Board made it clear that a "parity" clause as to which 
an employer would not be obligated to negotiate is one requiring that 
specific benefits subsequently granted by that employer to another labor 
organization for employees in another unit will ultimately be given to the 
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proponent of the clause during the life of its agreement. In Matter of City of 
New York, 10 PERB 113003, the majority of this Board explained why the inclusion 
of a "parity" clause contravenes the statutory scheme, and thus, found it to 
be a prohibited subject of negotiation with an employee organization. There 
the employer had already entered into an agreement with one organization con-
taining a provision that any benefit it would later accord to another 
organization for a different unit would ultimately be extended to the first 
unit. This would not be the effect of PBA's demands in the instant case. 
They are direct substantive demands for specific benefits. Although the level 
and nature of the benefits specified in the demands are derived from or may par 
allel the" terms'of agrefeffient of another employee organization, they are not 
sought to be made subject to automatic adjustment in the event that the other 
employee organization negotiates a more favorable agreement thereafter. More-
over, here the other employee organization represents employees of a different 
public employer. Hence, the right of that other organization to negotiate with 
that other employer is, in any event, not impaired by the level of benefits 
that might be negotiated by the parties in the instant case. Essentially, what 
we have here is the kind of ''pattern" bargaining that was approved as mandatory 
in our Albany decision. 
2. "If an employee requests that he be assigned to rotating tours 
of duty and is refused such request by the Chief of Police, he 
shall automatically become entitled to the additional compensa-
tion he would have earned if such request had been granted." 
Most police officers are assigned to rotating tours of duty. A few are 
not; they are assigned to special details. In most respects work in the 
special details is more attractive. To compensate for this, police officers 
assigned to rotating tours earn 17 days pay more than officers assigned to 
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special details. Some of the police officers assigned to special details may 
prefer the advantages of their assignments, others may prefer the additional 
compensation received by those on rotating tours. 
This is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. It is not a demand that 
all qualified employees be entitled to more favorable work assignments on a 
2/ 
rotating basis, which is a mandatory subject of negotiation. Neither is it a 
demand for increased compensation for all persons assigned to special details, 
which is also a mandatory subject of negotiation. Rather, it is in the nature 
of a penalty to be exacted merely because an officer has been denied an 
opportunity to perform alternative services which requires a higher rate of 
pay. PBA does not object to the rate differential on the merits. Thus, 
the demand is not for increased compensation for work performed but for 
additional money to be paid for work that is not to be performed. 
3. "Termination Pay (Lump Sum at Retirement)...An employee, his 
named beneficiary, or if none, his legatee or devisee, shall 
be entitled to cash payment for accumulated terminal leave 
computed on an entitlement basis of five (5) days for each 
year of completed service." 
The Village refusal to negotiate over this demand because it deems it to 
be a demand for a retirement benefit which is prohibited by §201.4 of the Taylor 
Law occasioned a charge by PBA in a companion case decided today. In our 
decision in that case, we determined that this demand is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. The reasons for that conclusion are stated in our opinion in 
that case. 
2/ Matter of Buffalo PBA, 9 PERB 1(3024 (1976) , reversed on other grounds by 
the Sup. Ct. , Erie Co., 9 PERB 1(7020 (1976), not officially reported. 
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4. "Hospitalization /(Deceased Employees)...If an 
employee with one (1) or more years of service or 
a retired employee deceases, his immediate family 
at the time of his demise shall receive the same 
hospitalization as presently provided for active 
employees at no cost to the survivors. The employee's 
spouse shall be given the benefit of this section 
until she re-marries, and the employee's children 
shall be given the benefit of this section until 
the age of nineteen (19) years unless attending 
college, in which case the age limit shall be 
twenty-three (23) years, or specifically qualified 
becauser^ f~menXar"r"e"tardat±on7—eTz'c'r^ '^ n^ wh^ Tch'xaBTe""- '" 
there shall be no age limit. This section shall 
be retroactive so as to provide this benefit for 
all employees regardless of the date of their 
demise and whether it occurred while an active 
or retired employee." 
The Village asserts that this is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation 
insofar as it relates to hospitalization benefits that will be received by 
the beneficiaries of police officers who are already retired and not, 
therefore, employees of the Village. It is correct. In Matter of Troy Uniformed 
Firefighters Association, Local 304, IAFF, 10 PERB 1(3015, we determined (at 
page 3034) that a public employer was "under no statutory duty to negotiate 
with respect to benefits for persons who are no longer public employees at 
the time of the negotiations." 
The Village also contends that this is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation insofar as it relates to hospitalization benefits that will be 
received by a beneficiary of current police officers who die after they 
retire. The reasoning of the Village is that this would be a retirement 
benefit that is prohibited by §201.4 of the Taylor Law. This is similar 
to the position of the Village on demand No, 3. It, too, is rejected for 
the reasons stated in the companion case. 
5. "Continuation of Benefits Clause. Upon the expiration 
of the contract, all terms, conditions, benefits, 
etc. shall continue until a new contract is signed." 
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In both Matter of Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 2304, 
IAFF, supra and Matter of Local 294, IBT, 10 PERB a,[3007, we determined that 
such a clause is a mandatory subject of negotiation. The Village would have us 
reverse those determinations because of the decision of the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department in Matter of Niagara Wheatfield Association, 54 App. Div. 2d 
498 (1976), a school district case. In that case, the court reversed an 
arbitration award in favor of the Niagara Wheatfield Administrators Association 
which extended the compensation index of an expired contract indefinitely. 
The contract language in that case was comparable to the language of the 
demand here. The court did not declare the agreement illegal, as the Village 
argues; rather, it remanded the matter to the arbitrator, stating: 
"We conceive that an award favorable to petitioner, 
albeit less so than the vacated award, could be made 
by the arbitrator by determining, for example, that 
paragraph D of article II of the agreement shall 
remain in effect for a reasonable time after June 30, 1975, 
in which the board and petitioner may negotiate a 
new contract...." (emphasis added) 
This is an indication that the court did not conclude that a continuation 
clause is inherently bad. Instead, it concluded that the continuation clause 
negotiated by the Niagara Wheatfield Association was bad insofar as the 
arbitrator interpreted it as applying indefinitely and, thus, for an 
unreasonably long period of time. This is a problem in the case of school 
district negotiations,for which the Taylor Law does not assure finality. 
In the instant case, however, the negotiations impasse is subject to interest 
arbitration under 1(209.4 of the Taylor Law. This was the situation in both 
the Troy and the Local 294, IBT cases. The availability of arbitration assures 
the parties of either a new agreement, or of an arbitration award, within a 
reasonable time after the expiration of a predecessor agreement. 
V "> 
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ACCORDINGLY, Lynbrook PBA should withdraw its demands for hospitalization 
for beneficiaries of employees who have already retired. It should also 
negotiate in good faith with the Village on all its other demands. The Director 
of Conciliation should render additional mediation service in order to assist 
the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of the dispute. In thirty days, 
he should report to us whether, in his opinion, efforts to achieve a voluntary 
settlement clearly have been, or will be unsuccessful. At that time we will 
consider whether the dispute is appropriate for arbitration. 
NOW, THEREFORE, with respect to those matters that we found PBA not to 
have negotiated in good faith, 
WE ORDER it to do so, and with respect to all other matters, the 
charges herein are dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1977 
ML, /&LUVQ^~ 
Ida Klaus 
I dissent from so much of the decision as determines that Demand No. 2 is 
not a mandatory subject of negotiation. It is a demand for premium pay for 
employees who deem their job assignment to be less desirable than an 
alternative assignment and are denied the opportunity to be given such an 
alternative assignment. The employer contends the demand is nonmandatory 
because it interferes with its right to schedule its work force. This 
contention is not persuasive. We have often ruled that a demand that would 
restrict the right of a public employer to deploy its employees is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation, but that the impact :of the employer's 
unilateral action is. The demand herein is one that goes to the impact of the 
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Village's unilateral determination regarding the scheduling of its police 
officers. It is not significantly different from demands for premium pay 
for overtime and split shifts or for minimum guarantees, for employees 
who are called to work when they are not normally scheduled. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1977 
-9 
ROBERT D. HELSBY/Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LYNBROOK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LYNBROOK POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#2E-8/10/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2317 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Village of Lyribrook 
from a hearing officer's decision finding it in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
1 
Taylor Law for having unilaterally discontinued, in part, payments of "termi-
nation pay" called for by a provision of an expired collective bargaining 
agreement while the parties were in the process of negotiating a successor 
2 
agreement. The Village did not fully comply with the "Termination Pay" pro-
vision because it interpreted the language added to §201.4 of the Taylor Law 
1 This section of the Act makes it an 
"improper practice for a public employer or its agents 
deliberately...(d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with 
the duly recognized or certified representatives of its public 
employees." 
2_ At issue is the following provision of an agreement between the Village 
and the PBA, which agreement expired on May 31, 1975: 
"J. Termination Pay. On separation from service after 
twenty (20)years, for any reason, other than cause, or 
upon the death in service of any employee...such employee 
or his legal representative shall be entitled to cash pay-
ment for accumulated terminal leave computed on an entitle-
ment basis of four (4) days for each year of completed 
service..." 
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by §6 of Chapter 382 of the Laws of 1973 as prohibiting such compliance. 
On August 20, 1976, the Village of Lynbrook (Village) sent a letter 
to members of the Lynbrook Police Department stating that: 
"Pursuant to the prohibition set forth in Section 6 
of Chapter 382 of the Laws of 1973...no termination 
leave or cash entitlement therefor would be accrued 
or paid to any employee of the Lynbrook Police Department 
for the years of service commencing June 1, 1973." 
This policy was made effective commencing October 1, 1976. The charge was 
filed by the Lynbrook Police Benevolent Association (PBA) after a police officer 
retired on September 30, 1976, following twenty years of service, and was paid 
termination pay for service only to May 31, 1973. However, a police officer 
who retired on January 2, 1976 (after the expiration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement on May 31, 1975, but prior to the Village's change of policy) 
received full termination pay in accordance with the agreement. 
The hearing officer found that termination pay is not prohibited by 
§201.4, that it is a mandatory subject of negotiation and that when the Village 
unilaterally changed its practice during a period when a successor agreement 
was being negotiated, it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. Having 
considered the record and briefs, we affirm the determination of the hearing 
officer. 
3^  Section 201.4 of the Act, as amended in 1973 by the addition of the under-
lined language, defines terms and conditions of employment as: 
"4. The term 'terms and conditions of employment' means salaries, 
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment provided, 
however, that such terms shall not include any benefits provided by 
a public retirement system, or payments to a fund or insurer to 
provide an income for retirees, or payment to retirees or their 
beneficiaries. No such retirement benefits shall be negotiated 
pursuant to this article, and any benefits so negotiated shall be 
void." (emphasis supplied) 
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If termination pay, such as involved in this case, is prohibited by 
§201.4, it can only be so by virtue of the phrase, "payment to retirees or 
their beneficiaries". The Village urges that, inasmuch as it has a twenty-
year retirement plan pursuant to §384-d of the Retirement and Social Security 
Law and that since termination pay is available only upon separation from 
service after twenty years, the monies would be paid to "retirees". The 
Village apparently recognizes (and concedes in its brief) that it would be 
obligated to make full termination payments to police officers who separate 
from service without retiring, but distinguishes such payments on the ground 
that they would not be to "retirees". It is likely, but not necessary, that 
those who receive termination pay under the agreement will do so upon retire-
ment. It is possible for an employee to receive the benefits of this ter-
mination pay provision without applying for retirement under the State 
Retirement System. Termination pay and other lump-sum payments for accumulated 
vacation or sick leave are related to the retirement system only by virtue of 
their effect upon the final average salary base. Section 431 of the Retirement 
and Social Security Law is designed to prevent possible abuses by prohibiting 
the inclusion of such payments made at the time of retirement in the salary 
base for computation of retirement benefits. 
Section 201.4 prohibits negotiation of "retirement benefits" which, in 
addition to benefits provided by a public retirement system, would include such 
matters as retirement allowances, pensions, annuities, disability allowances and 
other continuing payments after retirement which supplement pension 
payments. However, termination-pay is~. • -/'/'••' '• :• " " "" 
ane lump-sum payment in a fixed amount that is made at termination of service. 
It is a deferred payment for actual services rendered and is no different from 
lump-sum cash payments of accumulated vacation leave or accumulated sick leave. 
In Weber v. Levitt, 41 AD2d 452, aff'd 34 NY2d 797, the court recognized that 
Board - U-2317 -4 
such termination pay was earned by a full twenty years of service and that each 
year of service contributed equally to the amount of pay so earned and that the 
termination pay could not be considered as being earned only in the twentieth 
4. 
year. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the termination pay provision is not 
prohibited by §201.4; rather, it is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
While the agreement expired on May 31, 1975, the issue as framed by 
the parties — assumes that the termination payments continue during negoti-
ations for a successor agreement, subject only to the Village's contention that 
§201.4 of the Taylor Law required it to reduce the amount of that payment. This 
is also evidenced by the fact that the Village has made termination payments 
subsequent to the expiration of the contract in one instance and, after its 
change of policy on August 30, 1976, it has made payments pursuant to the con-
tract provision to another employee except for monies applicable to the years of 
service subsequent to June 1, 1973. Where the parties continue to apply the 
provisions of an. expired agreement,their conduct may properly be construed as 
effectively extending the old agreement, at least as to the particular pro-
5 
visions involved, until such time as a new agreement is consummated. 
4 See Board of Education, Town of Huntington v. Assoc. Teachers of Huntington, 
30 NY2d 122; New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. City of New 
York, Supreme Court, New York County, NYLJ 12/20/76. 
5 See Board of Educ. , Malone Central School Dist. and Malone Central Teachers 
Assn., 8 PERB 1(3043; Board of Educ, Malone Central School Dist. v. Malone 
Central Teachers Assn., 53 AD2d 417, 9 PERB 1(7526. The Appellate Division 
stated (53 AD2d at p. 419): 
"In Matter of Acadia Co. (Edlitz) (7 NY2d 348), the Court of Appeals 
found a valid written agreement to exist where the parties had orally 
agreed to extend a written contract containing an arbitration pro-
vision, taking the view that the parties' agreement to be bound by 
the written provisions of the old contract constituted sufficient com-
pliance with statutory requirements. Although in the present case the 
old contract has not been extended, we see no reason why the principle 
of Acadia should not apply to those provisions of the prior contract 
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Under these circumstances, the unilateral change of policy by the Village 
constituted a violation of §209-a.l(d). 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER the Village of Lynbrook to negotiate in good faith. 
DATED: New Stork, New York 
August 10, 1977 
ROBERT D. HELSBY,' Chairman 
r^U- J&tluU^^ 
IDA KLAUS 
(continued) 
to which the parties have agree to be bound by continuing a 
course of conduct. Indeed, given the fact that the employer-
employee organization relationship of the parties is bound 
to continue even in the absence of a final agreement and 
the importance of preserving harmony in that relationship, 
public policy demands that effect be given to those 
provisions which the parties by mutual conduct intend to 
apply in the governance of that relationship." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: #2F-8/10/77 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF AKRON, : 
Employer, : 
- and - . CASE NO. C-1508 
VILLAGE OF AKRON, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION 
On May 26, 1977, the Village of Akron, Civil Service Employees 
association, Inc., (herein referred to as the petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure (herein referred to as the Rules) 
of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (herein referred 
to as the Board) a timely petition for certification as the exclusive nego-
tiating representative for all Village employees of the Village of Akron 
(herein referred to as the employer). Thereafter, the parties entered into 
a Consent Agreement providing that the appropriate unit is as follows: 
Included: All Village Employees 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Patrolman, Superintendent 
of Public Works, Village Clerk, and all 
part-time employees. 
Pursuant to the Consent Agreement, a secret ballot election was 
)eld under the supervision of the Director on July 20, 1977. The results of 
C 
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ie election indicate that a majority of the eligible voters in the unit set 
forth in the Consent Agreement do not desire to be represented for purposes 
of collective negotiations by the petitioner.— 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the instant petition should be, 
and hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated at /New. XovkJ, HNLejwii fork 
This lQth day of August, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
Mt/±„ 
Ida Klaus 
1/ Of the 16 votes cast, two were in favor of representation and 14 were 
cast against representation. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT .RELATIONS ..'ARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONROE AND MONROE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Joint Employers, 
- and -
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES: 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
#26-8/10/77 
CASE NO. C-1367 
Petitioner, 
and 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., MONROE COUNTY CHAPTER, 
Intervenor. 
•—•-'-- CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE -AND:ORDER TCT NEGOTIATE-"- -^ — 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' .Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has bean selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED 'that the Security and Law Enforce-
ment Employees Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Deputy sheriff guard-1, deputy sheriff guard 2, 
deputy guard corporal, deputy guard sergeant, deputy sheriff 
prison transport, deputy sheriff corporal prison transport, 
deputy sheriff technician 1, deputy sheriff technician 2, 
deputy sheriff identification supervisor, woman jailer, 
assistant jailer matron, matron jailer, deputy sheriff patrol 
deputy sheriff corporal, deputy sheriff sergeant, deputy 
sheriff patrol .airport, deputy sheriff corporal airport, 
deputy sheriff desk, deputy sheriff investigator, sergeant 
investigator, deputy sheriff civil and deputy sheriff 
assistant supervisor civil, who are regularly scheduled, to 
work 25 or more hours per week. 
Excluded: Seasonal, temporary and all other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively, with the Security and Law Enforce-
ment Employees , Council 82, AFSCME,' AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such.employee organization 
tfith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall-
legotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
Setermination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10th day of August 1977 
Jpsepn R. Crowley ~/ 
4841 
Ida Klaus 
STATU OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS JARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ROME, V.I.P. TRANSPORTATION, 
Employer, 
- and -
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 582, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner.-
#2H-8/10/77 
CASE NO. c-1492 
""~"'"~~
:
 ~CERTIFrCATTON "OF REPRESENTATIVE AND 'ORDER"TO"NEGOTrATE'~""" 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations'Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair.Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 582, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described belov.', 
as their exclusive representative for the 'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Bus Driver Part-time, Bus Driver Full-time,' 
Automotive Mechanic and Mechanics Helper. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with- the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 582, AFL-CIO , 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
ith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
ietermination of, and administration of, grievances; 
Signed on the 10th day of August 19 77 . 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman' 
Josepjl R. Crowley 
Ida Klaus 
r& O #• O 
